For some years courts have wrestled with the issue of compensation & confiscation. Should the Crown Court make both a compensation order (in favour of the victim of the crime) & a confiscation order (effectively in favour of the Crown) in respect of the same benefit obtained by a convicted defendant?
The Court of Appeal recently considered the issue again in the case of Davenport v R  EWCA Crim 1731.
The power to make a compensation order in the Crown Court derives from s130 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The power to make a confiscation order in the Crown Court derives from s6 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The legislation clearly envisages that the Crown Court may make both a compensation order and a confiscation order when dealing with an offence.
In particular s13 PoCA 2002 (as amended by s6 Serious Crime Act 2015 with effect from 1 June 2015) defines a “priority order” in subsection (3A) to include a compensation order and sets out what the court is to do where a court is making both a confiscation order and one or more priority orders against the same person in the same proceedings and the court believes the person will not have sufficient means to satisfy all of those orders in full.
In these circumstances the court must direct that so much of the amount payable under the priority order(s) as it specifies is to be paid out of any sums recovered under the confiscation order; and the amount it specifies must be the amount it believes will not be recoverable because of the insufficiency of the person’s means, subsection (6).
The other types of priority order now identified in subsection (3A) include a surcharge order under s161A Criminal Justice Act 2003, an unlawful profit order under s4 Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 and a forfeiture order under s23 or s23A Terrorism Act 2000. It is anticipated that a slavery and trafficking reparation order under s8 Modern Slavery Act 2015 will be added to the list of priority orders in due course.
The Court of Appeal have considered the making of both compensation orders and confiscation orders against the same person in the same proceedings in the cases of Jawad v R  EWCA Crim 644 and of Davenport v R  EWCA Crim 1731. Both of these judgments post-date the UK Supreme Court decision in the case of R v Waya  UKSC 51 which highlighted the importance of proportionality in the making of confiscation orders and resulted in the amendment to s6(5)(b) PoCA 2002.
The problem is that whilst the statute law makes clear that it is possible for the court to make a compensation order and a confiscation order against the same person in the same proceedings – and sets out what the court should do if the offender cannot pay both orders in full, the statute gives no guidance as to what the court should do if the offender can pay both.
Since the decision in Waya and the amendment to s6(5)(b) would it now be disproportionate, and therefore wrong, for the court to make a compensation order and a confiscation order in respect of the same benefit obtained from the same offence against an offender who appears to be in a position in which he can pay both?
The Court of Appeal considered in Jawad that it generally will be disproportionate to require the defendant to pay for a second time money which he has fully restored to the loser – and an order for a lesser sum which excludes the double counting ought generally to be the right order. What will bring disproportion, said the Court, is the certainty of double payment. If it remains uncertain whether the loser will be repaid, a POCA confiscation order which includes the sum in question (and therefore requires the same benefit to be recovered twice – by compensation & confiscation orders) will not ordinarily be disproportionate, concluded the Court of Appeal.
In Davenport the Court of Appeal appears to have taken a slightly more relaxed approach. It held that mathematical certainty of restitution is not required. The court should approach matters in a practical and realistic way in deciding whether restitution is assured. Restitution to the victims in the future is capable of being properly assessed as assured, depending on the particular circumstances, notwithstanding that such restitution will not be immediate, or almost immediate, at the time of the confiscation hearing. Obviously the longer the time frame the greater force there will be to an argument that restitution is not assured: but a prospective period of delay in realisation is not of itself necessarily a conclusive reason for proceeding to make a combination of such orders without adjusting the amount of the confiscation order.
Whilst a defendant who is truly intent on making restitution in full to his victims ordinarily should be expected to have arranged such restitution prior to the date of the confiscation hearing there may sometimes be cases where that is not possible. If, in such a case, the court has firm and evidence-based grounds for believing that restitution may nevertheless be forthcoming, albeit that cannot be taken as “assured” at the time of the hearing, the court has power in its discretion to order an adjournment to enable matters to be ascertained.
But, said the Court of Appeal, each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Our contact details are here.
(Note: This article applies to confiscation proceedings under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation proceedings in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)