Tag Archives: fraud

UK Supreme Court rules on money laundering arrangements

Supreme Court logoThe UK Supreme Court recently ruled on the law relating to prosecutions for entering into, or becoming concerned in, an arrangement which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property for, or on behalf of, another person – contrary to s328 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

The case arose as a result of the actions of a fraudster, referred to as ‘B’.

Shortly before commencing his fraud the defendant, referred to as ‘H’, opened two bank accounts and handed control of them to ‘B’ who then used them in connection with his frauds.  ‘B’ conned unsuspecting members of the public into making payments into these bank accounts (for services which in truth were non-existent).

The prosecution case was that ‘H’ must have known or at least suspected that ‘B’ had some criminal purpose even if he was not aware of the details of the con.  ‘B’ was convicted of fraud.  ‘H’ was charged with becoming concerned in an arrangement contrary to s328 PoCA 2002.

The Supreme Court was required to consider whether, in the circumstances alleged, ‘H’ could be guilty of a s328 offence – R v GH [2015] UKSC 24 (22 April 2015).

The Supreme Court broke the issue down into four key questions.  In addressing those questions it overturned some decisions of the courts below.


1  Must the property be ‘criminal property’ before the arrangement operates on it?

Counsel for the prosecution submitted to the Supreme Court that the same conduct could both cause property to become criminal and simultaneously constitute the offence charged under s328.  He made the same submission in relation to sections 327 and 329, correctly recognising that the three sections have to be construed coherently.

So, he submitted, a thief who steals “legitimate” property is necessarily at the same time guilty of “acquiring criminal property” contrary to s329.

The Supreme Court rejected that view, holding that it failed to recognise the necessary distinction between a person who acquires criminal property and one who acquires legitimate property by a criminal act or for a criminal purpose.

Sections 327, 328 and 329 are aptly described as “parasitic” offences because they are predicated on the commission of another offence which has yielded proceeds which then become the subject of a money laundering offence.

The Supreme Court therefore approved the decision of the Court of Appeal in an earlier case R v Geary [2010] EWCA Crim 1925 that to say that s328 extends to property which was originally legitimate but became criminal only as a result of carrying out the arrangement is to stretch the language of the section beyond its proper limits.  I have discussed the Geary case more fully in an earlier article on this blog.

However, for example, a thief who steals legitimate property might then commit a s329 money laundering offence by his possession or use of that property after his acquisition of it.

In practice such a thief should normally face a charge of theft rather than one of money laundering.  But the legal point that he may also be guilty of a money laundering offence is an important one because of the obligation on banks & others in the ‘regulated sector’ to report suspicions of money laundering under s330.


2  Must the ‘criminal property’ exist before the defendant joins the arrangement?

The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeal in holding that it does not matter whether criminal property existed when the arrangement was first hatched.  What matters is that the property should be criminal property at a time when the arrangement operates on it.

It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not hold it to be necessary that the property should be criminal property at the time when the arrangement commences to operate on it.

The offence is complete when the arrangement becomes one which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property for, or on behalf of, another person and the defendant knows or suspects this to be the case.


3  Were the monies ‘criminal property’ before being paid into the defendant’s bank account?

Counsel for the prosecution made a somewhat technical submission to the Supreme Court that the monies banked were criminal property at the time of payment because they represented a chose in action, namely the obligation of the purchasers of the supposed services to pay for them.

The Supreme Court were unimpressed by this submission, holding that there was a stark absence of material before the court to substantiate a case of this nature.

However the court did not close the door on such an argument being successfully presented in a future case.


4  Was the actus reus of the offence committed on the facts of the case?

Looking at the substance of the matter, the money paid by the victims into the accounts was lawful money at the moment at which it was paid into those accounts.  It was therefore not a case of the account holder acquiring criminal property from the victims.

But by the arrangement the respondent also facilitated the retention, use and control of the money by or on behalf of ‘B’.  Did the arrangement regarding the facilitation of the retention, use and control of the money fall foul of s328 on the basis that it was criminal property at that stage, since it was the proceeds of a fraud perpetrated on the victims?

In this case the character of the money did change on being paid into the defendant’s accounts.  It was lawful property in the hands of the victims at the moment when they paid it into the defendant’s accounts.  But it then became criminal property in the hands of ‘B’, not by reason of the arrangement made between ‘B’ and the defendant, but by reason of the fact that it was obtained through fraud perpetrated by ‘B’ on the victims.

There was a crucial difference therefore between this case and the situation in Geary (in which the arrangement itself had been the reason that the property in question became criminal property).

The Supreme Court (overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal) held that there was no artificiality in recognising that change in character of the money, and that it would be appropriate to regard the defendant as entering into or becoming concerned in an arrangement to retain criminal property for the benefit of another.

It was the retention, use & control of the monies after they had been paid into the bank accounts as the result of a fraud, under the bank account arrangement made earlier between ‘B’ & ‘H’, which could properly form the basis of a conviction of ‘H’ under s328.


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(Note: This article applies to prosecutions under the provisions of Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales.  There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s trial in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this.  Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Confiscation – the basics

photo 123 - copyright David Winch 2014This post aims to be an introduction to the basics of confiscation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England & Wales.  It includes links to more detailed articles dealing with particular elements of confiscation law (shown like this).

A word of warning.  An introduction like this can be broadly correct but cannot cover the full detail of the legislation nor can it cover those unusual circumstances which may be exceptions to the general guidance contained here.

Be warned too that words and phrases used in confiscation often have a specific technical meaning which is not the same as their meaning in everyday English conversation.  That applies particularly to terms such as ‘benefit’, ‘criminal lifestyle’ and ‘available amount’.


When does confiscation apply?

Confiscation proceedings can only be commenced when a defendant has been convicted (either in the Crown Court or Magistrates’ Court) of one or more offences from which he has obtained a benefit.  All confiscation proceedings in England & Wales are conducted in the Crown Court in front of a judge but without a jury.

A wide range of offences can form the basis for confiscation proceedings, including offences such as theft, fraud, drugs offences, money laundering and tax evasion. However confiscation orders are not imposed in every case in which a defendant obtains a benefit. In the year to 31 March 2013 approximately 673,000 persons were convicted of an offence (not all of which involved any benefit being obtained) but only 6,392 confiscation orders were imposed.

Confiscation proceedings are initiated by the prosecution.  There are no published criteria specifying when confiscation proceedings will be initiated.  Where the defendant has obtained a benefit from an offence of which he has been convicted and the prosecution ask for confiscation proceedings to be initiated the court has no discretion to refuse.

The legislation is intended to deprive defendants of the benefit they have gained from relevant criminal conduct, whether or not they have retained such benefit, within the limits of their available means.  The benefit gained is the total value of the property or advantage obtained, not the defendant’s net profit after deduction of expenses.


The court procedure

Whilst the judge can make a confiscation order at the time of sentencing a convicted defendant, in many cases the judge will at that time simply set a timetable for further steps towards confiscation.

This normally involves firstly a requirement for the defendant to supply detailed information about his financial affairs; secondly the prosecution to provide a report identifying the amount of benefit said to have been obtained by the defendant and (usually) identifying his ‘available amount‘ (this is referred to as the s16 statement); thirdly the defendant is required to respond to the prosecution’s report indicating the extent to which he agrees and disagrees with it; and finally there will be a hearing scheduled which will culminate in the making of the confiscation order.

In practice the initial timetable may be revised if difficulties or delays arise so these steps may take months, or even years, to complete.

Evidence which would be inadmissible at trial may be admitted in confiscation proceedings.


The three decisions

Assuming that the defendant has obtained a benefit from an offence of which he has been convicted, the court then has three key decisions to make.

  • Firstly what benefit has the defendant obtained from the offence or offences of which he has been convicted (including any other offences ‘taken into consideration’ when sentencing)?
  • Secondly, if the defendant has a ‘criminal lifestyle‘, what benefit is he to be assumed to have obtained in addition to the benefit obtained from the offence or offences of which he has been convicted?
  • Thirdly what is his ‘available amount‘?

In confiscation proceedings the burden of proof generally rests upon the defendant rather than the prosecutor – particularly in rebutting the statutory assumptions where the defendant has a ‘criminal lifestyle‘ and in satisfying the court that the defendant has an ‘available amount‘ which is less than his ‘benefit’.  In each case the court will make its decision on the basis of the ‘balance of probabilities’, see s6(7) PoCA 2002.


Benefit obtained from the offence

The legal position is that a person obtains a benefit from criminal conduct if he obtains ‘property’ (which means an asset of any description) or a pecuniary advantage as a result of or in connection with that criminal conduct, see s76 PoCA 2002.

Sometimes the benefit obtained from the offence is quite obvious.  If I steal £10,000 from your bank account I have obviously obtained a benefit of £10,000.

But in many cases the benefit obtained will be less obvious.  For example if John is a member of a group of people and is convicted of conspiracy to supply controlled drugs there may be a number of issues arising concerning the extent of John’s involvement in the conspiracy and the valuation of the drugs.  If Peter has obtained a mortgage advance dishonestly his benefit will be a proportion of the increase in value of the property since he purchased it.

However the courts will always be looking to the benefit “obtained” – not the benefit “retained”.  Where the court is satisfied that a particular benefit has been obtained jointly by more than one person it will treat each person as having obtained the whole of that benefit – but will place a cap on the overall recovery of jointly obtained benefit from the different defendants.


Assumed benefit of criminal lifestyle

In many cases the defendant will be held to have a ‘criminal lifestyle‘ and this will trigger the statutory assumptions set out in s10 PoCA 2002.  The effect may be to increase very substantially the defendant’s total alleged benefit.

These assumptions relate to the defendant’s receipts and payments since the ‘relevant day’ (normally the day six years before the day on which he was charged with the offence) up to the day on which the court makes the confiscation order (but in practice the assumptions are usually applied only up to an earlier date for convenience) and the defendant’s assets held at any time after the date of his conviction (whenever they were first obtained).

A defendant has a ‘criminal lifestyle‘ if the criteria set out in s75 are satisfied, but not otherwise.  The criteria relate to the offence or offences of which the defendant has been convicted – they do not relate to his ‘lifestyle’ in the everyday sense of that word.

It is in ‘criminal lifestyle‘ cases in which the services of a forensic accountant may prove particularly valuable in challenging the prosecutor’s s16 statement.

There is an obvious danger of excessive benefit figures and double counting where the ‘criminal lifestyle‘ assumptions are made.


The defendant’s available amount

The defendant’s ‘available amount‘ includes all his assets currently held (with a deduction for liabilities secured on those assets) and the current value of any ‘tainted gifts’ he has made, see s9 and s81 PoCA 2002.

The court will not consider, for the purpose of determining the defendant’s ‘available amount‘, whether those assets which he currently holds were obtained legitimately or not – that does not matter at this stage.


The confiscation order

In order to reach its decisions the court may hold a hearing at which oral and written evidence from both sides will be presented.

However in many confiscation cases the prosecution and defence will negotiate agreed figures for ‘benefit’ and ‘available amount‘ prior to the scheduled hearing of oral evidence.  In that event there will be only a brief hearing before the judge at which he will be invited to approve the agreed figures which then become the basis for the confiscation order.

Before finalising the order the court may need to consider whether the application of the statutory assumptions has created a serious risk of injustice and whether the proposed order would be disproportionate and infringe the defendant’s human rights.

Only very rarely will the amount of the confiscation order be limited to the profit arising from the criminal conduct.

The court will normally order the defendant to pay, within a specified period of time, a sum of money equal to the lower of (a) his total benefit and (b) his available amount.

If the court has no information from which it is able to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the defendant has an ‘available amount‘ which is less than his total ‘benefit’ it will make a confiscation order in the amount of the ‘benefit’.

Where the court accepts that the defendant’s ‘available amount‘ is less than his total ‘benefit’ a brief list of the assets which form the defendant’s ‘available amount‘ should be appended to the confiscation order issued by the court.

The court will typically allow up to six months for payment (from 1 June 2015 this is limited to three months as a result of amendments to confiscation law).  The court will also set a default sentence, which is a period of imprisonment the defendant may be required to serve if he does not pay the required sum.

The defendant may subsequently return to court to ask for a six month extension to the time to pay, making a maximum of 12 months in all from the date of the confiscation order (from 1 June 2015 this is limited to a further three months making six months in all from the date of the confiscation order).

Interest is charged on any amount which remains outstanding after the due date for payment, s12.



Either prosecution or defence may appeal against the confiscation order.  Appeal is to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) and ultimately to the Supreme Court.  An appeal ought to be initiated within 28 days of the confiscation order but late appeals may be heard in some circumstances.


Subsequent events

Where a confiscation order has been made in the amount of the defendant’s ‘available amount‘ and subsequent realisation of his assets identified in the confiscation order produces a lesser amount than anticipated, the defendant (or the prosecution) can apply to the court under s23 to have the amount of the defendant’s confiscation order reduced to reflect his revised ‘available amount‘ based on the actual amounts realised.

Where evidence comes to light which was not available to the prosecution at the time of the confiscation hearing which indicates that the defendant’s benefit was greater than that found by the court at that hearing the prosecution can, within 6 years of the date of conviction, apply to the court for the benefit figure to be increased under s20 or s21.

Where a confiscation order has been made in the amount of the defendant’s ‘available amount‘ (which was less than his benefit) the prosecution can apply to the court, at any time, for an order under s22 requiring the defendant to pay a further amount where he has a current ‘available amount‘ which would enable him to satisfy a new order – but he may not be required to pay an amount more than the court believes to be just.  In that sense a confiscation order may be regarded as a ‘life sentence’.

Where only a small balance remains outstanding on a confiscation order the court may discharge the order under s24 or  s25.

Where, following a fresh conviction on a subsequent occasion, a defendant finds himself subject to confiscation proceedings a second time the usual rules may be modified on the second time around.


Other confiscation topics

Other confiscation topics, such as restraint orders, the impact of bankruptcy on confiscation and adjustments for changes in the value of money are covered in further articles in this blog.  A full list of confiscation articles is here.


Contacting us

Our contact details are here.


(Note: This article applies to confiscation proceedings under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales.  There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation proceedings in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this.  Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

A confiscation case study – the career fraudster

Books - copyright David Winch 2014On 16 June 2014 the Court of Appeal in London heard the appeal of Mr Sam Ernest against a confiscation order in the sum of £308,380 made against him at Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court.  The Appeal Court judgment R v Ernest [2014] EWCA Crim 1312 makes interesting reading.

Mr Ernest purported to run a business as an events organiser.  He would claim to have contacts from whom he could obtain sought-after tickets to popular high profile events, such as Wimbledon, the London Olympics, rock concerts or film festivals, in return for money.

Mr Ernest sometimes provided the tickets for which he had been paid, but often he would not.  When tickets were not provided he would usually promise refunds – on some occasions refunds were given, but on others they were not.


The victims

His victims were in the main either wealthy people or organisations who could afford to pay substantial sums of money for prestige events, or men whom he had befriended or women with whom he entered into relationships.

One woman with whom he was having a relationship got a party of 18 people together, some from the USA, to attend events at the London Olympics.  She paid almost £4,000 to Mr Ernest.  He continued to promise that the tickets would arrive right up until after her friends had arrived in the UK.

In total Mr Ernest defrauded his victims of over £48,000.


The police investigation

Mr Ernest’s activities had first been reported to the police in 2009, but they took no action at that stage.  It was not until 2012, when a special team of police officers were investigating fraud associated with tickets for the London Olympics, that attention was focused on his activities.

On discovering that the police wished to speak to him, Mr Ernest prevaricated and would not agree to attend for interview.  No doubt this was in part because he was a United States citizen who had entered the UK on a six month tourist visa in 2005 and was an illegal over-stayer. His passport had expired in 2010.

However in December 2012 Mr Ernest pleaded guilty to 17 counts of fraud and was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.  Confiscation proceedings followed.


The confiscation proceedings

Mr Ernest was subject to confiscation proceedings on the basis that he had a ‘criminal lifestyle‘ having been convicted in the same proceedings of more than 3 offences from which he had obtained a benefit and had, in aggregate, obtained a benefit of at least £5,000, s75 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

The Appeal Court judgment does not, of course, give a full history of the confiscation proceedings.  We do not know what was in the prosecution’s s16 statement or in Mr Ernest’s response.  We do know, however, that the confiscation went to a full hearing in the Crown Court which heard evidence from a Detective Constable Knowles and from Mr Ernest.


The prosecution assertions

DC Knowles referred to bank accounts held by a Ms Barbara Howell which had apparently been used by Mr Ernest (and by Ms Howell for legitimate purposes).  There was also a bank account in the name of J Bailey Morgan which apparently Mr Ernest controlled.  DC Knowles considered the movements on these bank accounts since the ‘relevant day’, which it was agreed was 29 August 2006 (six years prior to the date on which Mr Ernest had been charged).

DC Knowles calculated the amount of money in these accounts paid in by known victims together with all of the unexplained credits to the accounts, that is all the monies deposited during the relevant period other than those which represented Ms Howell’s legitimate earnings and funds. This figure came to £209,980. This figure included sums specifically identified as being monies paid into that account by persons identified as victims of Mr Ernest’s activities.

The prosecution invited the court to assume all these sums credited to the various bank accounts to be benefit of Mr Ernest’s general criminal conduct pursuant to s10(2).  Presumably to avoid risk of double counting the prosecution did not seek to assert, as benefit of particular criminal conduct, any additional benefit of the 17 offences of which Mr Ernest had been convicted.

However the prosecution did assert that a further assumed benefit arose, under s10(4), in respect of Mr Ernest’s day to day living expenses over the period since the ‘relevant day’.  These were estimated at £16,400 per year for 6 years, so £98,400 in total.  The prosecution accepted that to some extent Mr Ernest had been financially supported over this period by a succession of girlfriends but contended that, even so, he would have incurred this £98,400 expenditure himself.

In consequence, the prosecution’s total benefit figure was £308,380.  The prosecution apparently did not accept that Mr Ernest’s ‘available amount’ would be less than his benefit.


The defence evidence

Mr Ernest asserted that on at least some occasions he had supplied tickets for which he had been paid and on other occasions he had made refunds to customers.  So it would not be correct, in his view, to treat the entirety of the sums banked as benefit.  He also asserted that he had no assets available and no hidden assets.

However the defence produced no books and records of the business and no report of a forensic accountant, nor did the defence produce documentary evidence of Mr Ernest’s current ‘available amount’.  The defence relied upon the oral evidence of Mr Ernest.


The judgment in the Crown Court

The Crown Court judge entirely rejected the oral evidence of Mr Ernest.  He was, the judge concluded, a “career fraudster” who had used the bank accounts of others and had produced no documents in support of his oral evidence.  The judge concluded that he was a dishonest man who had lied repeatedly under oath.

The judge accepted the benefit figure of £308,380 asserted by the prosecution and found that the defendant had not discharged the burden upon him to show that his ‘available amount’ was less than his benefit.

Accordingly he ordered Mr Ernest to pay £308,380 within 6 months, with a default sentence of 3 years consecutive to the prison term he was already serving.


The Court of Appeal judgment

On appeal it was argued that the judge should have reduced the benefit figure to reflect legitimate business activities conducted by Mr Ernest where he had provided tickets or had made refunds.  Furthermore Mr Ernest had incurred expenditures in obtaining the tickets which he had supplied.

The Court of Appeal would have none of this.  It noted the absence of evidence in support of the asserted legitimate activities and commented that “the fact that some unidentified proportion of that money might conceivably be referable to some specific (but unidentified) business transaction does not render the making of the assumption incorrect”.

The Court was not prepared to make any reduction in the benefit figure in respect of expenses which Mr Ernest might have incurred.  It regarded the occasional provision of tickets by Mr Ernest as a means of furthering his fraudulent purpose by luring customers to do more business with him.

The £209,980 assumed benefit arising from credits to the bank accounts was therefore upheld.

But the Court of Appeal did accept that the bank statements showed expenditures by Mr Ernest on his living costs.  These expenditures had therefore been met from monies already included in assumed benefit.  This undermined the prosecution’s assertion that Mr Ernest would have incurred £98,400 of living expenditure funded entirely by additional assumed criminal conduct.  There was no other suitable figure before the court, so this head of benefit was omitted on appeal.

In consequence the benefit figure was reduced to £209,980.  The court ordered Mr Ernest to pay this lower figure and reduced the default sentence to 2 years 6 months.



One doesn’t know whether in this case the defence had instructed a forensic accountant or not.  It is possible that a forensic accountant’s report had been obtained but had not been disclosed as part of the defence evidence (perhaps for good reason!).

However it should come as no surprise to find a Crown Court judge entirely rejecting the unsupported oral evidence of a convicted defendant.  Possibly if a forensic accountant had given evidence in the Crown Court confiscation hearing the judge might have accepted that the defendant, having incurred the expenses shown on the bank accounts, would not have had an ‘available amount’ equal to the total of his assumed benefit.  Such a conclusion would have been consistent with the Court of Appeal decision in McIntosh & Marsden v R [2011] EWCA Crim 1501.

In the event this defendant seems destined to serve his default sentence in due course.


(Note: This article applies to confiscation proceedings under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation proceedings in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Supreme Court caps confiscation enforcement

Supreme Court logoThe UK Supreme Court has capped confiscation enforcement in cases where more than one confiscation order covers the same joint benefit.  The result is that the State will be unable to recover in excess of 100% of the benefit jointly obtained.  It is as if the confiscation order created a joint and several liability of the defendant to ‘repay’ the benefit jointly obtained.

The principle is simple – but the practical implications may on occasion be complex.

In fact the Supreme Court judgment on 18 June 2014 in the cases of R v Ahmad & Ahmed and R v Fields & Others [2014] UKSC 36 dealt with another point too – confirming that under the law of confiscation if two or more persons obtain a benefit jointly they each obtain the whole of it.  That point is considered in a separate blog article.


The problem

The problem may best be understood by a simple example.  Suppose John and Jim get a couple of guns, walk into a bank together and rob it of £10,000.  Subsequently they are caught and convicted and are made subject to confiscation orders.  In those confiscation orders each of John and Jim will have a benefit of £10,000.  Assuming each of them has sufficient assets it seems that in total they will be required to ‘repay’ £20,000 into court.  So, it appears, the court will recover twice the amount stolen.

The Supreme Court concluded that that could not be right.  Recovering double the amount stolen would be disproportionate.  It would not serve the real aims of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and it would be a violation of the defendants’ rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.


The simple answer

The simple answer is to require each of the confiscation orders against John and Jim to provide that it is not to be enforced to the extent that a sum has been recovered by way of satisfaction of another confiscation order made in relation to the same joint benefit.

This is what the Supreme Court held in its judgment at para [74].

So if the court recovers £5,000 from John it will only recover a further £5,000 from Jim.  Of course that means if the court recovers £10,000 from John then it will recover nothing from Jim, but the Supreme Court said that criminals have to accept that risk of unfairness.


Potential complications

Although the principle is clear and the reason for it is straightforward, its application in practice may be more complicated.

Suppose that as well as John and Jim robbing the bank there was a getaway driver, Jack.  Let’s suppose Jack was not caught at the time, but a good while later he is caught and convicted.  If he is subject to confiscation then presumably he cannot be liable to pay anything if the court has already received £10,000 from John and Jim.  So that is a bit of luck for Jack!

Let’s consider some other defendants.  Peter and Phil are fraudsters operating a fake business in which they order goods on credit, sell them and disappear – pocketing the money and never paying their suppliers.  Peter and Phil had a joint bank account for the fake business which received £50,000 from customers over a period of just under one year.

Peter and Phil are caught, convicted of fraudulent trading contrary to s9 Fraud Act 2006 and subject to confiscation.  In the confiscation proceedings each of them has a ‘criminal lifestyle‘ having been convicted of an offence carried on for at least 6 months from which a benefit of at least £5,000 has been obtained, s75 PoCA 2002.

Peter and Phil each have a benefit of £50,000 from the offence of which they have been convicted.  But that is not the end of the story.

The separate personal bank accounts which Peter and Phil have are examined and the statutory criminal lifestyle assumptions are applied.  There are £70,000 unexplained credits in Peter’s bank account and £25,000 unexplained credits in Phil’s bank account.  In consequence the court finds Peter’s total benefit for confiscation purposes to be £120,000 and Phil’s total benefit to be £75,000.

Peter’s available amount is £80,000 and Phil’s is £45,000.  So the court makes confiscation orders against Peter for £80,000 and against Phil for £45,000.

If Peter pays the £80,000 and Phil pays nothing, can enforcement proceedings still be taken against Phil?  If they can, how much can be enforced against Phil?  I do not think the Supreme Court judgment helps me answer these questions because I need to know how much of the £80,000 recovered from Peter relates to the £50,000 benefit jointly obtained and how much of it relates to the other £70,000 assumed benefit of Peter’s.

For example if the £80,000 recovered from Peter includes all the £50,000 jointly obtained benefit of the fraud then the most that can be enforced against Phil is his additional assumed benefit of £25,000.

But, at the other extreme, if the £80,000 recovered from Peter comprises £70,000 re his additional assumed benefit and only £10,000 re the jointly obtained benefit then it would appear that the whole £45,000 can be enforced against Phil (because he still has unrecovered amounts of £40,000 joint benefit and £25,000 additional assumed benefit).

Looking at this another way, if we make a presumption that in each case the first £50,000 of the amounts ordered to be paid by Peter and Phil related specifically to the jointly obtained benefit then the £80,000 paid by Peter has repaid all of the jointly obtained benefit and so (arguably) there can be no enforcement action against Phil.  But that would seem to be a nonsensical outcome.


Default sentences

We also need to consider the implications for default sentences.

Going back to John and Jim.  They each had a benefit of £10,000 from the bank robbery.  Let’s assume the confiscation orders against each of them specified a default sentence of 6 months.  If the court recovers £5,000 from John – so it can then only enforce a maximum of £5,000 against Jim – does that result in a corresponding reduction in Jim’s default sentence if he fails to pay?

My guess is that Jim will indeed have his default sentence effectively reduced.  But the Supreme Court judgment does not provide the answer.

Presumably Jack, the getaway driver, cannot be made to serve any default sentence if the court has already recovered the £10,000 from John and Jim.  And what about Phil the fraudster – what is the position regarding his default sentence?


In conclusion

It seems to me that in solving one problem the Supreme Court have risked creating further problems in relation to the enforcement of confiscation orders.

If it were decided that any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the defendants then (i) all recoveries from any defendant should be applied against his benefit jointly obtained in priority to his other benefit, and (ii) each defendant’s default sentence ought to be reduced pro-rata when the amount enforceable against him reduces (whether this arises as a result of a recovery from him or as a result of a recovery from another person relating to benefit obtained jointly with him).


(Note: This article applies to confiscation proceedings under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation proceedings in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Dealing with rogue tax accountants

Do HM Revenue & Customs have the powers, the resources and the determination to deal with rogue tax accountants?

I am not here referring to those who promote the complex and sophisticated tax avoidance schemes which make newspaper headlines.  I am referring to small firms of tax accountants, or one man bands, who act for small or micro businesses for modest fees but who are – in a small minority of cases – utterly incompetent, irresponsible or even dishonest.


Poor work

The sorts of poor work performed by this small minority include over-claiming of expenses, under-declaration of gross income, erroneous taxable profit computations and claims for tax reliefs, and a lack of integrity which allows the tax accountant to ‘change history’ by backdating events such as the declaration of a dividend of the commencement of a business partnership.

Undoubtedly these sorts of accidental or deliberate ‘errors’ by a small minority of incompetent, irresponsible or dishonest tax accountants cost HMRC millions in lost taxes every year.


Tax accountants or tax agents?

I refer to these people as tax accountants.  HMRC would refer to them as tax agents, because they act as the agent for their client in dealing with HMRC.  However their clients would refer to them as their accountant, not their agent, and so I am referring to them as tax accountants rather than tax agents.


Why would a rogue accountant succeed?

Proprietors of small and micro businesses generally have neither the skills nor the desire to get involved in the nitty gritty of accounts preparation or the completion of their annual tax returns.  They are unlikely to be in a position to evaluate the competence of their tax accountant except to the extent of regarding a lower tax bill as a sign of a better service.

A rogue accountant may be able to produce a lower tax bill for a smaller fee, and ask fewer irritating questions of his client, than a more competent tax accountant would in performing his work thoroughly and with integrity.


So what’s the problem?

A rogue accountant will cause problems for HMRC in terms of tax revenues which are ‘lost’ and problems for competing honest and competent tax accountants who will be unable to offer an apparently comparable service.

But ultimately a rogue tax accountant will create a problem for his client if and when HMRC investigate his tax affairs and seek from him payment of under-declared taxes, interest and penalties.


Current trends

There are a number of current trends which, in the author’s view, will lead to a worsening of the problem.  Whilst a reduction of ‘red tape’ for small businesses is welcome in many respects, the simplification of accounting and tax return requirements gives more scope for rogue tax accountants to continue in practice undetected.  At the same time it has become increasingly prevalent for individuals to earn their living by self-employment, requiring the completion of a self assessment tax return, rather than as employees of larger organisations.

This has coincided with a reduction in HMRC staff numbers and a new emphasis on relying on tax accountants to file information directly into HMRC computer systems so that fewer sets of figures are routinely reviewed, even briefly, by HMRC staff.  Indeed HMRC are working on proposals to give tax accountants greater scope to deal with their clients’ tax affairs without the intervention of HMRC staff.


The role of professional accountancy bodies

But isn’t it the role of the professional accountancy bodies to ‘police’ their members to ensure that they are honest, competent and act with integrity?

Although it is not well known, anybody can set up in business as an accountant and act as a tax agent.  It is estimated that approximately one in four tax agents registered with HMRC holds no recognised accountancy or tax qualification.

So whilst the professional accountancy bodies do exercise a role in ‘policing’ their members, there is nothing they can do to ‘police’ non-members.


What are HMRC and the government doing?

HMRC can and do prosecute rogue tax accountants.  But such prosecutions are few in number because a criminal prosecution is very resource intensive, expensive and slow to come to fruition.  HMRC have a high success rate in securing convictions when they do prosecute – but that may simply be an indication that they prosecute only in the worst and most obvious cases.

Penalties can be very severe upon conviction.  Cheating HMRC is one of the relatively few criminal offences in English law for which there is no maximum sentence.

Aside from criminal prosecution, HMRC have power to levy civil penalties on tax accountants under Schedule 38 Finance Act 2012.

But all of these powers relate only to dishonest tax accountants – not to those who are merely incompetent or irresponsible.


Tax Agent Initiative Team

Perhaps in an attempt to fill that gap, HMRC have established a Tax Agent Initiative Team (TAIT) which has identified tax accountants whose clients appear to include a relatively high number of tax repayment cases – with a particular emphasis on subcontractors in the construction industry (CIS repayment cases).  TAIT is conducting a programme of contacting these accountants, initially by letter, with a view to ensuring an acceptable standard of work by them in relation to the examination of their clients’ business records and the accuracy of tax returns submitted by them on behalf of their clients.

In particular TAIT is requesting tax accountants whom it has identified to voluntarily agree, by way of a signed Memorandum of Understanding, to confirm that the tax accountant:

  • will examine underlying client records, at least on a sample basis,
  • will ensure that each client views and approves his completed tax return before it is submitted to HMRC, and
  • does not complete any subcontractor’s tax return in which expenses claimed exceed 20% of gross income unless the tax accountant has seen all the records to support that level of expenditure.

Alongside the Memorandum of Understanding programme, HMRC are conducting visits to some tax accountants to discuss HMRC’s expectations of the professionalism to be exhibited by them.

HMRC point out that in the event of a lack of cooperation from the tax accountant they may put a temporary stop on tax repayments in respect of tax returns submitted, pending completion of HMRC’s own assurance tests on returns submitted by that tax accountant.

The focus of this exercise is on tax repayment cases – not on cases in which tax is payable by the client but in a lower amount than the true liability.


What is not being done?

HMRC have no requirement that a person acting as a tax accountant must be ‘fit and proper’.  There is no express legal provision a stop an individual acting as a tax accountant if he has, for example, a previous conviction for tax fraud.  (Extremely rarely HMRC will decide to withdraw the tax agent status of an accountant but this has apparently been done only twice in the history of HMRC and on the basis that HMRC has a general discretion in discharge of their functions under s9 Commissioners for Revenue & Customs Act 2005.)

Nor is there any requirement that a person has any particular knowledge or skills before acting as a tax accountant.  Anybody can set up as a tax accountant.

There is no legal requirement for a tax accountant to have a separate bank account, known as a ‘client account’, to safeguard monies which he receives but which belong to his clients – such as income tax repayments which he has received on their behalf.

Even more surprisingly, HMRC have no powers to levy civil penalties on a tax accountant who is incompetent or irresponsible (without being dishonest) and consequently files tax returns which understate his clients’ tax liabilities.  HMRC, and English law, take the view that where incorrect tax returns are filed penalties are chargeable on the client – not the tax accountant.  It is then for the client, if he can, to recover the penalty from the tax accountant by suing him for negligence – but there is no legal requirement for a tax accountant to carry insurance to cover any such claims.

Although the provisions of Schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 could be read as creating a liability to penalties for a tax accountant who incompetently or irresponsibly files an incorrect return for his client, HMRC have indicated that they have no intention of levying penalties on tax accountants under this legislation.

So it seems that the burden is on clients, and potential clients, of tax accountants to ensure that the person they instruct is sufficiently competent, thorough and honest to do the work properly.  Or, of course, a taxpayer can simply do the job himself, calculating his own taxable income – and the best of luck with that!


(Note: This article refers to tax law in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to tax liabilities and penalties in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in an article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Accountant sentenced to 7 years for cheat & fraud

Legal wig copyright David Winch 2014An accountant has been sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment for cheating HMRC and defrauding his clients.

Simon Terry Pearce, 48, who held no recognised accountancy qualifications, ran S T Pearce Accountants from offices in St Austell, Cornwall.  He was convicted on 26 charges after a ten week trial at Truro Crown Court.  The prosecution evidence assembled by HM Revenue & Customs ran to approaching 40,000 pages and, in total, 51 prosecution witnesses were called to give evidence.


The allegations

It was alleged that over a period of several years Mr Pearce had operated his practice dishonestly by preparing tax returns for his clients which overstated their business expenses and the tax which they had suffered under the Construction Industry Scheme (CIS tax), overclaimed capital allowances particularly in relation to cars and – in relation to Capital Gains Tax – understated the sales proceeds of properties.  In many cases Mr Pearce had revised previous years’ tax returns for new clients.  The result of all this was that his clients’ tax liabilities were dishonestly understated and tax refunds were generated falsely.

It was further alleged that Mr Pearce had forged clients’ signatures and dishonestly abused HMRC’s Structured Action Request online system for taxpayers and their authorised agents with the result that clients’ tax refunds were paid by HMRC into his bank account rather than to the clients.  Whilst in some cases these refunds were forwarded to clients fully and reasonably promptly, in many cases refund payments were delayed (sometimes by a period of years), or paid on only in part, or not paid on at all.

Finally it was alleged that in relation to Mr Pearce’s own tax returns he had dishonestly understated his fee income and that he had failed to register his business for VAT at the appropriate time.


Mr Pearce’s defence

Mr Pearce said that he had not been dishonest. The tax returns which he had prepared for clients reflected the information which clients had provided to himself and his staff at interviews with them.  He had included fair estimates of expenditures for which the clients had no documentary evidence, particularly in relation to travelling and subsistence.  He had misunderstood tax law in relation to motor cars, believing that 100% first year allowances or annual investment allowances were available, and the abolition of CGT taper relief in 2008 had not come to his attention.

He had arranged for clients’ tax refunds to be paid to his bank account when fees were due to him.  His failure to pass the balance of refunds on to clients was as a result of inadequate and misleading information received from HMRC, poor record keeping in his office and pressure of work resulting from having taken on too many clients.  He had fobbed off clients who had enquired about their refunds and had given them excuses and explanations for delays which were untrue.  He accepted that he had used HMRC’s online Structured Action Request facility to arrange refunds to be paid to him but believed he was entitled to do so.

He asserted that clients’ income tax returns were only submitted to HMRC after clients knew what was on them, albeit that the clients may have received and signed paper copies of the returns only after they had been filed online with HMRC.


My role

I was instructed by Mr Pearce’s solicitors and counsel to advise them on generally accepted conduct by accountants in relation to the preparation of accounts and tax returns for clients, relevant tax law and practice, the proper treatment of clients’ tax refunds, and to examine Mr Pearce’s own business records and those of certain of his clients, together with the associated accounts and tax computations, to advise whether tax liabilities had been understated.

I attended court and advised the defence team throughout the presentation of the prosecution case but I was not myself called to give evidence.  The only witness called by the defence was Mr Pearce himself.


The clients’ evidence

The clients typically gave evidence to the effect that they relied upon and trusted Mr Pearce as their accountant to deal properly with their accounts and tax affairs.  In many cases they denied providing Mr Pearce with information which he claimed to have received from them.

They did not themselves understand accounts or tax and believed that their tax returns were being correctly prepared and that they were entitled to any refunds which they had received.  They were devastated when they learned that they were required to repay substantial sums to HMRC.


The outcome

The jury found Mr Pearce guilty on 26 of the 30 counts which he faced.  Clearly the jury considered him to have been thoroughly dishonest over a period of years.


The lessons to be learned

Mr Pearce frequently received tax refunds on behalf of clients but did not operate a client bank account.  In practice refunds received were swallowed up by business and private expenses leaving Mr Pearce unable to pass on to clients the monies which were due to them.

The firm’s working papers and interview notes in support of figures in the accounts and tax returns were inadequate to demonstrate persuasively which figures were based on information that had been provided by clients and which were based on estimates made by Mr Pearce apparently based on his general knowledge of his clients’ activities – or to refute the allegations that some increases in claimed expenses arose purely from fabrications by Mr Pearce.

In many cases business expenses in accounts and returns had apparently been compiled based only on an examination of paid bills and discussions with clients – and without examination of clients’ bank statements.  In the majority of cases which I examined Balance Sheets had not been prepared.  Had the accountancy work been more thorough then many mis-statements which were made on tax returns, for example from duplication of genuine expenditures, could have been avoided.

Either Mr Pearce’s knowledge of tax law and practice was faulty and out of date in important respects or he was claiming allowances and reliefs for his clients which he knew were not available to them.



This was a very significant prosecution by HMRC, the biggest case ever prosecuted by them in Cornwall, and a major case by any standards.  Few Crown Court trials run to ten weeks or involve over 50 witnesses and few criminal investigations generate approaching 40,000 pages of exhibits.  The prosecution asserted that Mr Pearce had ultimately retained £170,000 in refunds due to his clients and that overall HMRC had lost between £1 million and £2 million as a result of his activities.

I have no doubt that my advice was valuable to the defence in professionally examining the prosecution evidence and ensuring that it was appropriately challenged.  Ultimately the weight of evidence against Mr Pearce was overwhelming and the jury were sure that he had been dishonest.


(Note: This article refers to a criminal prosecution in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to criminal proceedings in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in an article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Confiscation and multiple defendants

Police lamp copyright David Winch 2014The Court of Appeal in London recently considered a couple of questions which arise where more than one defendant is convicted and then subject to confiscation.  Where benefit is obtained jointly by co-defendants should each of them be regarded as obtaining the whole of the benefit which they obtained jointly?  Secondly, is it proper for confiscation orders to be made against the various co-defendants which require them to pay in total more than the amount obtained from the offence?


These questions arose in the case of Fields and Others v R [2013] EWCA Crim 2042.  Essentially the position was that the co-defendants, Mr Fields, Mr Sanghani and Mr Sagoo had been engaged in a fraud between January and June 2005 which generated £1,410,762.  Each of them was convicted of having been at the heart of the fraud and so each of them had jointly obtained the benefit of it.

In the Crown Court the judge made confiscation orders against each of them recording a benefit of the entire amount obtained in the fraud (uplifted for inflation between 2005 and the date of the confiscation order under s80(2)(a)).

When it came to considering the ‘available amount‘ of each defendant, the Crown Court judge concluded that none of the defendants had satisfied him that he had an ‘available amount‘ less than his benefit.  Accordingly he made confiscation orders against each of the defendants in the full amount of the benefit generated by the fraud.

Each of the defendants appealed against the confiscation orders.


Benefit jointly obtained

In relation to the benefit jointly obtained it was argued on appeal that – whilst each of them had obtained an interest in the entire £1,410,762 obtained from the fraud – the value of each defendant’s interest was only a one-third share (because of the impact of the interests held by the other defendants).  It was contended that, in consequence, s79(3) applied and resulted in the value of each defendant’s benefit being equal to one-third of the value of the total amount obtained by the fraud.

The Court of Appeal rejected that contention.  They considered the argument to be “altogether too artificial”.  They remarked that, “Section 79(3) of the 2002 Act is to be taken as, generally speaking, extending to making allowance for lawfully subsisting prior interests of other persons: not to the asserted ‘beneficial interests’ of co-conspirators whose very criminality has caused the relevant property to be obtained jointly in the first place”.

Furthermore they pointed out that there was precedent case law, binding upon them, particularly from the House of Lords decisions in R v May [2008] UKHL 28 and R v Green [2008] UKHL 30, which was wholly against the defendants’ argument on this point.  The Court of Appeal did not consider that more recent decisions, such as that of the Supreme Court in R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51, had undermined the authority of the House of Lords’ earlier decisions in this connection.

In truth it seems that there was little prospect of the defendants succeeding on this argument in the Court of Appeal and it may be expected that the decision will now be further appealed to the Supreme Court (which would not necessarily be bound by the earlier case law).  It may be noted that the possible implications of s79(3) were not discussed in the House of Lords’ judgments in those earlier cases.


Available amount and multiple recovery

The Court of Appeal considered whether it was open to the Crown Court judge to hold that none of the defendants had satisfied him that his ‘available amount‘ was less than his benefit.  The Appeal Court upheld the Crown Court judge’s findings on that point.

The defendants then argued that, as a result of the three confiscation orders, the Crown would (if the orders were satisfied) recover three times the amount obtained from the fraud.  They submitted that this multiple recovery operated like a fine upon the defendants and was disproportionate and a breach of the defendants’ rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘A1P1’).

The argument based on disproportionality relies heavily upon the Supreme Court decision in Waya.  But Waya was not a case involving more than one defendant and the particular issue of multiple recovery was not a relevant consideration in that case.

The Court of Appeal rejected the defendants’ arguments on this point also.  They considered that the House of Lords cases again were authority, binding upon them, which were against the defendants’ submissions – and that the decision in Waya had no impact on this issue.

The confiscation orders made against each defendant by the Crown Court judge had reflected the amount of the benefit obtained by him.  The confiscation legislation, said the Court of Appeal, “requires the focus of attention to be on depriving each defendant of the proceeds of his crime”.  But the defendants’ argument would require each confiscation order to take into account the confiscation orders made against co-defendants – and that was not appropriate.

However this again is a point which the Supreme Court may be asked to consider if the case is further appealed.

Of course if the defendants had been successful in reducing their benefit to one-third of the amount obtained by the fraud then the issue of multiple recovery would have evaporated.


Delays in making the confiscation orders

Finally, it is interesting to note that in this case the police action against these defendants commenced in mid-2005.  The defendants were convicted of the fraud in November 2008.  The confiscation orders were made in the Crown Court in February 2010 (against Mr Fields) and November 2012 (against Mr Sanghani and Mr Sagoo).  The Court of Appeal decision was handed down in November 2013 (more than 8 years after the offence was committed) and the matter may yet go to a further hearing before the Supreme Court!


UPDATE: On 18 June 2014 the Supreme Court confirmed that the benefit should NOT be apportioned amongst the conspirators (see new blog article “UK Supreme Court rules on benefit obtained jointly“) but that the enforcement of each defendant’s confiscation order should be subject to a proviso that the State shall not recover more than 100% of the benefit jointly obtained, effectively creating a joint and several liability of the conspirators to ‘repay’ the benefit obtained jointly (see new blog article “Supreme Court caps confiscation enforcement“).

(Note: This article applies to confiscation orders under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation order in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

A book-keeper accused of stealing

Beatrix was Mr McGregor’s book-keeper – or more correctly she was a self-employed book-keeper and Company Secretary working for Mr McGregor’s company, which was an agency supplying circus acts and finding ‘C’ list celebrities to open supermarkets and the like.  But times were tough and it seemed like, however hard Mr McGregor worked, he was just scraping by.

Fortunately Mr McGregor could rely on the faithful Beatrix to look after the paperwork and pay the bills and the part-time staff.  One Sunday Mr McGregor was wondering how much there was in the company’s accounts with the District Bank and the Provincial.  So, unusually for him, he had a look at the bank statements.

He was shocked by what he saw.  Not only was there next to nothing in either of the company bank accounts but a quick check of the bank statements showed numerous transfers in the past month or two to Beatrix and to her daughter, and payments to Rentaphone and CloudsTV (neither of which Mr McGregor knew anything about) as well as several cash machine withdrawals and petrol purchases.


The police

Mr McGregor phoned the police and arranged an interview with Detective Constable Carrott.  He made a formal statement alleging that Beatrix had stolen money from the company.

DC Carrott interviewed Beatrix who said that all the expenditures were legitimate and had been authorised by Mr McGregor who had agreed that the company should pay Beatrix’s phone and TV subscriptions and her petrol bills.  The cash had been drawn on Mr McGregor’s instructions.  Some had been used to pay company bills in cash and the rest had been handed over to him.  There was nothing in writing because Beatrix and Mr McGregor had a relationship based on trust.  Beatrix denied any wrongdoing.

DC Carrott met with Mr McGregor again.  He denied authorising payment of any of Beatrix’s bills and he denied receiving any of the cash.

Mr McGregor now produced to DC Carrott bank statements and voluminous accounting records going back over more than two years revealing a stream of unauthorised payments and withdrawals made by Beatrix.  In total over £40,000 had been stolen, he alleged.

Meanwhile DC Carrott did a little digging and found that, while she was working for Mr McGregor’s company, Beatrix had been receiving Job Seeker’s Allowance and Council Tax Benefit on the basis that she was not working and had no earnings.

Beatrix was charged with theft of cash and fraud by abuse of position in relation to Mr McGregor’s company and making false representations to obtain Job Seeker’s Allowance and Council Tax Benefit.


The solicitor

After consulting her solicitor Beatrix decided to plead guilty to making false representations to obtain benefits but continued to deny any wrongdoing in relation to Mr McGregor’s company.  She told her solicitor that Mr McGregor was being untruthful and that it was inconceivable that Mr McGregor had (as he claimed) been unaware of the payments to her (which she sometimes had made direct to her daughter’s bank account to save time) and of her bills for phone, TV and petrol.  The business was a small one and the bank statements went direct to Mr McGregor who also had an accountant check everything and prepare annual accounts.

The solicitor contacted us and asked us to prepare a report based on an examination of the prosecution evidence (amounting to over 1,200 pages) and Beatrix’s responses.


Our involvement

We provided a fee quotation to enable the solicitor to obtain a prior authority from the Legal Aid Agency.  We also, at this initial stage, wrote to the solicitor outlining the sort of further documentary evidence which would assist us if it were available and indicating that, in our experience of other small businesses, allegations of theft by trusted members of staff were not a rarity and that this indicated that all too often in practice business owners failed to exercise sensible supervision over book-keepers and others with control over company monies.

When we examined the prosecution exhibits we found amongst them copies of emails which had apparently routinely been sent by Beatrix to Mr McGregor each week setting out the payments she was making out of the business accounts, and the monies received from customers.  The listed payments included staff wages and payments to Beatrix (in relation to which she had submitted sequentially numbered invoices as she was technically self-employed).

But whilst the emails showed one weekly payment to Beatrix, she was typically taking a dozen or more payments per month.  Often more than one payment to Beatrix referred to payment of the same invoice.  Sometimes the same invoice had been paid out of both of the two company bank accounts.  So although the amount of any one payment was not unreasonable the number of these payments and their total value was clearly inconsistent with the information which Beatrix was emailing to Mr McGregor.

We reported that we were simply unable to say what had happened to the cash withdrawn from the company bank accounts as there was no evidence beyond the contrasting assertions of Beatrix and Mr McGregor.

However the prosecution estimate of the amount of ‘wages’ legitimately due to Beatrix was, in our view, a significant underestimate.  The prosecution figure was based on £85 per week whereas the emails clearly showed payments of up to £175 per week to Beatrix (of which Mr McGregor must have been aware and which he had, by implication, approved).  Taking that into account the prosecution figure of the amount stolen was, in our view, overstated by £10,490.

Attached to our expert witness report were schedules detailing the amounts paid from the company bank accounts to Beatrix and members of her family, the amounts reported as paid to her on her emails to Mr McGregor, and the cash withdrawals from the bank accounts.


The outcome

The solicitor discussed our report with Beatrix.  After thinking it over for a few days Beatrix decided to plead guilty at Liverpool Crown Court to theft and fraud in relation to Mr McGregor’s company (as well as the benefit fraud offences).  She was given a suspended prison sentence, ordered to do 180 hours unpaid work and required to pay compensation of £1,200 to Mr McGregor’s company.

That is undoubtedly a better result than she would have obtained had she gone to trial and been convicted.


N.B. Names and certain other details have been changed to protect client confidentiality.

(Note: This article relates to a criminal prosecution in England and Wales. There are a large number of additional issues which could be relevant to criminal proceedings in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Appealing out of time after a change of law

When the law changes can an appeal be made to the Court of Appeal outside the normal time limits?

Normally an appeal against a decision of the Crown Court in England and Wales has to be submitted within 28 days of the decision. But the Court of Appeal can give leave for an appeal to be heard where the deadline has been missed – and has done so in some cases where the deadline has been missed by months or even years.

Where a defendant has suffered a decision which, though it appeared to be well founded at the time it was made, now appears to be incorrect in the light of subsequent case law, what is the position regarding the submission of an appeal out of time?

This is an issue which arises from time to time – and may be particularly topical following the decision of the UK Supreme Court in the case of R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51.


The general rule

The general rule is that the Court of Appeal will not allow an appeal to be made out of time if the only reason for the appeal is that subsequent cases have shown the previous perception of the legal position was mistaken.

This was set out many years ago in the case of R v Mitchell [1977] 65 CAR 185 when it was said that, “It should be clearly understood, and this court wants to make it even more abundantly clear, that the fact there has been an apparent change in the law or, to put it more precisely, the previous misconceptions about the meaning of a statute have been put right, does not afford a proper ground for allowing an extension of time in which to appeal against conviction”.

That rule has been reiterated many times since.  See, for example, the comment, “alarming consequences would flow from permitting the general re-opening of old cases on the ground that a decision of a court of authority had removed a widely held misconception as to the prior state of the law” from the case of Ramsden [1972] Crim LR 547 and repeated, with approval, in the case of R v Ramzan & Others [2006] EWCA Crim 197 at paragraph [30].

In the case of R v Cottrell [2007] EWCA Crim 2016 it was said, at paragraph [42], “there is a continuing public imperative that so far as possible there should be finality and certainty in the administration of criminal justice.  In reality, society can only operate on the basis that the courts administering the criminal justice system apply the law as it is.  The law as it may later be declared or perceived to be is irrelevant”.

But there have been exceptions made to the general rule.


Substantial injustice

It does appear to be the case that where the Court of Appeal can be satisfied that a defendant has suffered a substantial injustice then it can be persuaded to hear an appeal out of time. In the case of Hawkins [1997] 1 Cr.App.R 234 the Court of Appeal commented that “the practice of the Court has in the past, in this and comparable situations, been to eschew undue technicality and ask whether any substantial injustice has been done”.
So, for example, where a defendant has been convicted of an offence of which, under a new understanding of the law, he could not now be found guilty – but the evidence shows that he must have been guilty of another similar offence (of which he had not been charged), then the Court of Appeal will generally not allow an appeal to be heard out of time. This was the position of a Mr Malik who had been convicted of conspiracy to launder money prior to the ruling in R v Saik [2006] UKHL 18 (which changed the law regarding the conspiracy offence where there was merely a suspicion that monies were proceeds of crime). The Court of Appeal considered that there was ample evidence of the substantive offence of money laundering in Mr Malik’s case and refused him leave to appeal his conviction out of time.

In R v Charles [2001] EWCA Crim 1755 the Court of Appeal said, at paragraph [41], “In practice judges and courts are probably not as reluctant to grant extensions of time as the authorities may suggest. It has been the experience of the members of this Court that consideration will usually be given to the merits before declining to grant an extension of time. Both in Jones (No. 2) and Asraf, the merits were considered notwithstanding the absence of any proper explanation for the delay. There are some cases, such as those where the applicant wishes to rely on fresh evidence unavailable at trial, where the extension of time will be readily granted. There are cases such as those envisaged in Hawkins where it will not be”.


Failure to address a key issue

Perhaps slightly different are cases where, because the law was not properly understood at the time, a key issue in the proceedings was not recognised and addressed in the Crown Court. This is illustrated by the case of Bell & Others v R [2011] EWCA Crim 6.

Mr Bell was subject to a confiscation order made in 2007 after he had been convicted of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the duty chargeable on cigarettes contrary to section 170(2)(a) Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. The confiscation order was based on the amount of duty evaded when the cigarettes in question had been smuggled into the UK. But in fact it does not follow that a person committing this offence is himself liable for the duty and thus has ‘obtained’ a pecuniary advantage which would form the basis for a confiscation order. That had not been appreciated by the Crown Court at the time the confiscation order was made. In consequence the Crown Court had not addressed the question of whether Mr Bell was himself liable for the evaded duty and evidence relevant to that issue had not been obtained.

Subsequently the Court of Appeal had decided the case of White & Others v The Crown [2010] EWCA Crim 978 which highlighted this issue. Mr Bell then lodged an appeal against the confiscation order made against him three years earlier.

Before the Court of Appeal it was accepted that, in fact, Mr Bell had not been personally liable for the evaded duty. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the confiscation order out of time because “it would be a grave injustice not to grant leave”.

In place of a benefit of £157,775 based on the evaded duty, Mr Bell was made subject to a confiscation order of just £950 based on the payment he had received for his role in the smuggling offence.


The impact of R v Waya

We have yet to see whether the Court of Appeal will grant leave to appeal confiscation orders out of time following the decision of the UK Supreme Court in the case of R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51.

The Waya case decided two points of principle: (1) confiscation orders should not be ‘disproportionate’ because that would infringe Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and (2) a mortgage applicant does not ‘obtain’ a mortgage advance (for confiscation purposes) if that advance is simply paid to a solicitor, acting on behalf of both the applicant and the lender, and then remitted to the vendor of the property being purchased (or his solicitor) – because the mortgage applicant does not at any stage gain ‘control’ of the monies advanced.
It may be that defendants who have been subject to a confiscation order which they consider is more severe than the Crown Court would have made had the decision in Waya been available at the time will now seek to appeal their orders. It will be very interesting to see how such appeals are dealt with by the Court of Appeal.


EDIT: A further article on the subject updates the position: Appealing a confiscation order out of time.

(Note: This article applies to confiscation orders under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation order in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this. Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)

Unprosecuted mortgage fraud in criminal lifestyle confiscations

After the UKSC decision in R v Waya, what is the position of a defendant subject to ‘criminal lifestyle’ confiscation who has obtained a mortgage advance by fraud but has not been prosecuted for that?

The November 2012 decision of the UK Supreme Court in R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51 dealt with confiscation under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 where the defendant had been convicted of mortgage fraud but did not have a ‘criminal lifestyle’ within the meaning of s75 PoCA 2002. But the implications of the judgment go far wider.

This article considers the relatively common situation in which a convicted defendant is subject to confiscation on the basis that he does have a ‘criminal lifestyle’ and it appears that he may have previously obtained a mortgage advance by fraud although he has not been prosecuted for that.


A worked example

Let’s take the example of William who is a self-employed engineer. Five years ago he purchased Rose Cottage, a four bedroomed house in an idyllic country location, for £775,000. He put up a 40% deposit from his own legitimate money, that’s £310,000. The remaining 60%, or £465,000, he obtained fraudulently by giving false details of his income to the mortgage lender. Two years ago William got involved in dealing in controlled drugs. He was arrested, charged and convicted of possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply. He is now subject to confiscation proceedings under PoCA 2002 on the basis that he has a ‘criminal lifestyle’.

William still owns Rose Cottage. The outstanding mortgage is still £465,000 – it is an ‘interest only’ mortgage and William has kept up the payments to the lender. The open market value of Rose Cottage is now £1,200,000.

We need to consider the impact of the statutory ‘criminal lifestyle’ assumptions on the calculation of William’s ‘benefit’ (if any) in connection with his ownership of Rose Cottage and the mortgage fraud.


The first assumption

The first assumption is found in s10(2) PoCA 2002 which says:
“The first assumption is that any property transferred to the defendant at any time after the relevant day was obtained by him (a) as a result of his general criminal conduct, and (b) at the earliest time he appears to have held it.”

Prior to the UKSC decision in Waya the likelihood is that the court would have treated the £465,000 mortgage advance as “property transferred to the defendant” and therefore an assumed benefit of £465,000 would have arisen from it in William’s confiscation.

However in the light of paragraph [53] of the Supreme Court judgment it now appears to be the case that the £465,000 was not “property transferred to the defendant” and so no benefit can arise under the first assumption in relation to the mortgage fraud.

Similarly any suggestion that Rose Cottage itself should be regarded as property transferred to the defendant “as a result of his general criminal conduct” would run counter to paragraphs [46] and [47] of the Supreme Court judgment in Waya.

But that is not the end of the story, as we need to consider the other assumptions of s10.


The fourth assumption

Let’s look at the fourth assumption next – because we need to get that out of the way.  The fourth assumption is found in s10(5) PoCA 2002 which says:

“The fourth assumption is that, for the purpose of valuing any property obtained (or assumed to have been obtained) by the defendant, he obtained it free of any other interests in it.”

But all the assumptions of s10 are subject to s10(6) which says:

“But the court must not make a required assumption in relation to particular property or expenditure if (a) the assumption is shown to be incorrect, or (b) there would be a serious risk of injustice if the assumption were made.”

It seems irrefutable that the mortgage lender has an interest in Rose Cottage and so, to that extent, the fourth assumption is negated because it has been “shown to be incorrect”.  That will be important when we consider the implications of the second assumption.


The second assumption

The second assumption is found in s10(3) PoCA 2002 which says:

“The second assumption is that any property held by the defendant at any time after the date of conviction was obtained by him (a) as a result of his general criminal conduct, and (b) at the earliest time he appears to have held it.”

William does hold Rose Cottage, subject to the mortgage lender’s interest in it, after the date of his conviction.  Rose Cottage is now worth £1,200,000 and the outstanding mortgage is £465,000 – so William’s interest in the property is now £735,000 (his ‘equity’ in the property).  That includes an increase in value, or “appreciation”, of £425,000 (the difference between the £775,000 purchase price and the current value of £1,200,000) .

Following the logic applied by (the majority judgment of) the Supreme Court in Waya in paragraphs [70] and [71] of the judgment we can say that, because 40% of the original purchase price was funded by William’s own legitimate funds and 60% was funded by the fraudulently obtained mortgage, only 60% of the “appreciation” is a ‘benefit’ for confiscation purposes.

In relation to the other 40% of the “appreciation” and William’s initial deposit (which was legitimate monies) the second assumption is “shown to be incorrect” on the facts.

So the benefit arising, under the statutory assumptions, in relation to William’s ownership of Rose Cottage and the mortgage fraud is 60% of the “appreciation” of £425,000, which amounts to £255,000.

Note that this conclusion does not depend upon whether the mortgage advance was obtained after the ‘relevant day’ (defined in s10(8) and normally six years prior to the date on which the defendant was charged with the offence of which he has been convicted).


Proportionality and serious risk of injustice

The final issue is whether such an outcome would be disproportionate and hence an infringement of William’s human rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (‘A1P1’).  Since the outcome under the statutory assumptions is the same as that which would have arisen had William been charged with, and convicted of, the mortgage fraud and in the case of Waya the Supreme Court held that this outcome was not disproportionate, then it seems clear that William’s rights under A1P1 have not been infringed.

For similar reasons it appears that this calculation of assumed benefit does not involve a “serious risk of injustice” which would be relevant to s10(6)(b).

Happily this analysis leads to an outcome which is entirely consistent with the outcome in the rather different circumstances of Mr Waya’s case as I have described in an earlier blog article.

As an aside, I am bound to say that any conclusion that a defendant who had NOT been convicted of mortgage fraud should suffer a more severe outcome in confiscation, as a result of the operation of the statutory assumptions, in relation to that mortgage fraud than another defendant who had been convicted of mortgage fraud would be open to attack as involving an unacceptable “serious risk of injustice”.


But . . .

But what if the situation had been slightly different?  Suppose William had purchased Rose Cottage with his domestic partner Mary – and Mary had not been convicted of any offence and was not subject to confiscation?

Would Mary’s interest in the equity in Rose Cottage have the effect of halving William’s benefit under the statutory assumptions?  Would it make a difference whether William and Mary owned Rose Cottage as joint tenants or tenants in common?

These issues did not arise in the Waya case.  We may however see these issues aired in future confiscation hearings.


(Note: This article applies to confiscation orders under the provisions of Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in England and Wales. There are a number of additional issues which could be relevant to a defendant’s confiscation order in particular cases which it is not possible to deal with in a relatively short article such as this.  Appropriate professional advice should be sought in each individual case.)